Abstract-We propose and analyze transmit antenna selection with receive generalized selection combining (TAS/GSC) for physical layer security enhancement in multiple-input multipleoutput wiretap channels. In this protocol, a single antenna out of NA antennas is selected at the transmitter and LB antennas out of NB antennas are combined at the legitimate receiver. We characterize the physical layer secrecy of TAS/GSC via our new closed-form expressions for the exact and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. We demonstrate that the maximum secrecy outage diversity gain of NANB is achieved.
transmit antenna [10] [11] [12] . Motivated by these benefits, the secrecy outage probability of transmit antenna selection (TAS) was derived in [10] . More recently, TAS with receive selection combining (TAS/SC) and TAS with receive maximal-ratio combining (TAS/MRC) was examined in [11] for multiple antennas at the transmitter, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper. Considering MRC at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, [12] characterized the effect of antenna correlation on the secrecy performance.
In this letter, we propose transmit antenna selection with receive generalized selection combining (TAS/GSC) in MIMO wiretap channels to bridge the secrecy gap between TAS/SC and TAS/MRC. In the proposed protocol, a single antenna from N A available antennas is selected at the transmitter to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver. At the legitimate receiver, GSC is applied to select the L B antennas with the highest SNRs from N B available antennas [13, 14] . During the transmission, an unauthorized eavesdropper attempts to intercept the signal by selecting L E from N E available antennas using GSC 1 . We first derive a new exact closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability with TAS/GSC over Rayleigh fading channels. Importantly, this expression provides a generalized framework to bridge the gap between TAS/MRC and TAS/SC presented in [11] . We then derive a new compact expression for the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. This result confirms that the secrecy outage diversity gain is equal to N A N B , which indicates that TAS/GSC achieves the same secrecy outage diversity gain as TAS/SC and TAS/MRC in MIMO wiretap channels. We further highlight that the tradeoff between each of the protocols is characterized as a concise ratio of their respective secrecy outage SNR gains. For the same secrecy outage probability, the SNR gap between TAS/GSC and TAS/SC is derived as
The SNR gap between TAS/GSC and TAS/MRC is derived as
Finally, we show that the secrecy rate of TAS is close to that of TBF when N A is small without added feedback and signal processing complexities.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We consider a MIMO wiretap channel with N A antennas at the transmitter (Alice), N B antennas at the legitimate receiver (Bob), and N E antennas at the eavesdropper (Eve). We focus on quasi-static fading channels with independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) block Rayleigh fading in the main channel from Alice to Bob, and in the eavesdropper's channel from Alice to Eve. In both channels, we assume that the transmission block length is less than or equal to the coherence time. Furthermore, we consider the practical passive eavesdropping scenario where the CSI of the eavesdropper's channel is not available to either Alice or Bob.
In Here, j * allows Alice to select the strongest transmit antenna and θ j * allows Alice to determine the size of the codebook with random binning for secure transmission [2] . As such, the feedback overhead of TAS is lower than that of TBF since TBF necessitates CSI feedback of N A L B complex numbers.
To perform secure transmission, Alice encodes each message w into a codeword
where n is the length of x. The transmitted codeword is subject to an average power constraint denotes the expectation, I NB denotes the N B × N B identity matrix, and σ 2 is the noise variance at each receive antenna. The instantaneous SNR of the main channel is given by
The received signal vector at Bob at time i is given by
in descending order of magnitude. We further denote γ B = E[γ B ]/L B as the average SNR per antenna at Bob. In the eavesdropper's channel, the received signal vector at Eve at time i is given by
T is the eavesdropper's channel vector between the j * th transmit antenna at Alice and the N E receive antennas at Eve, and n E is the N E × 1 AWGN vector at Eve which satisfies E n E n † E = I NE σ 2 . Since the antenna index j * is independent of g, the strongest transmit antenna for Bob corresponds to a random transmit antenna for Eve. At Eve, we consider GSC to combine the L E strongest antennas from N E available antennas. As such, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper's channel is given by
in descending order of magnitude. We further denote γ E = E[γ E ]/L E as the average SNR per antenna at Eve.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF TAS/GSC
The achievable secrecy rate of this MIMO wiretap channel is defined as
where [x] + denotes max{0, x}. In passive eavesdropping, the transmission from Alice is performed at a constant code rate R S . When C S > R S , the transmission from Alice guarantees perfect secrecy. When C S < R S , the transmission is vulnerable to eavesdropping and perfect secrecy is not guaranteed. This indicates that the rate at the eavesdropper is not zero. As such, the secrecy outage probability is a relevant performance measure for passive eavesdropping [2, [10] [11] [12] . We first present the statistics of γ B and γ E . The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of γ B is obtained using [13, eq. (4) ] and the polynomial expansion as
where
and
In (2), we define lρ for ρ ∈ {B, E} as
Based on [13, eq. (4) ], the cdf of γ E with a random transmit antenna at Alice and GSC at Eve is given by
A. Exact Secrecy Performance
In this subsection, we quantify the exact secrecy performance achieved by TAS/GSC by deriving the exact secrecy outage probability in closed-form. The secrecy outage probability is given by
where f γB (·) and f γE (·) denote the probability density functions (pdfs) of γ B and γ E , respectively. Taking the first derivative of F γB (γ) in (1) and F γE (γ) in (6), we obtain f γB (γ) and f γE (γ), respectively. Substituting these pdfs into (7) and applying [15, eq. (3.326.
2)] to solve the resultant integrals, we derive the exact secrecy outage probability in closed-form as
where 1 , 2 , and 3 are easy-to-handle finite sums of standard functions defined as
In (9), (10) , and (11), we define Ξ as
where α k , β k , and δ k , are functions of L B given in (2), (3), and (4), respectively. Notably, the expression for P out (R S ) in (8) is derived in closed-form and is valid for general scenarios with arbitrary SNRs and arbitrary numbers of antennas. Based on (8), we are able to calculate other secrecy performance metrics. For example, the probability of positive secrecy is evaluated as Pr (C S > 0) = Pr (γ B > γ E ) = 1 − P out (0). We can also examine the ε-outage secrecy rate, R max S , which specifies the maximum secrecy rate when the secrecy outage probability is less than ε [6, 11] . According to (8) , the ε-outage secrecy rate is determined as P out (R max S ) = ε.
B. Asymptotic Secrecy Performance
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy outage probability in the high SNR regime with γ B → ∞ 2 . The asymptotic result allows us to determine the secrecy outage diversity gain and the secrecy outage SNR gain, which are two factors governing the secrecy outage probability at high SNRs.
We proceed by deriving the first order expansion of F γB (γ) in (1) . Applying the expansion [15, eq. (1.211.1)], the first order expansion of
NANB . Based on this result, we obtain the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as
2 When γ E is higher than γ B , the probability of successful eavesdropping approaches one as γ E → ∞. In this case, the secrecy outage probability can be derived using Fγ B (γ) in (1) and the first order expansion of
The result is omitted due to page limits.
where the secrecy outage diversity gain is
and the secrecy outage SNR gain is
In (15), we define Λ as
According to (13), we offer the following remarks to provide insights into the use of TAS/GSC in the main channel.
Remark 1: The secrecy outage probability approaches zero as γ B approaches infinity.
Remark 2:
The maximum secrecy outage diversity gain of N A N B is achieved. This diversity gain is entirely dependent on the main channel.
Remark 3: The secrecy outage diversity gain is not affected by the choice of L B and L E . The impact of L B and L E is only reflected in the secrecy outage SNR gain.
C. Secrecy Performance Tradeoff
We now examine the secrecy outage tradeoff between TAS/GSC, TAS/SC (i.e., L B = 1), and TAS/MRC (i.e., L B = N B ) at the legitimate receiver. From (14) , we confirm that TAS/GSC has the same diversity gain as TAS/SC and TAS/MRC. As such, the tradeoff between them is solely characterized by their respective secrecy outage SNR gains. Maintaining the use of GSC at the eavesdropper, we present the SNR gap between TAS/GSC and TAS/SC in the main channel as
L B ! dB. We confirm that Δ 1 > 0 and the SNR gap increases as L B increases. We also present the SNR gap between TAS/GSC and TAS/MRC as
We confirm that the SNR gap decreases as L B increases. Observing Δ 1 and Δ 2 , we find that these SNR gaps are entirely dependent on N B and L B . Notably, they are not affected by N E and L E .
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we examine the secrecy performance of TAS/GSC. Fig. 1 plots the secrecy outage probability versus γ B for R S = 1. Notably, our asymptotic curves from (13) accurately represent the secrecy outage diversity gain and the secrecy outage SNR gain, and our exact curves from (8) are well-validated by Monte Carlo simulations marked with '•'. We first see that the secrecy outage diversity gain is
We also see that the secrecy outage probability improves with increasing L B . As expected, we see that the secrecy outage probability approaches one when γ B < γ E . Importantly, we highlight that TAS/GSC brings a significant SNR advantage relative to TAS/SC. We also highlight that TAS/GSC provides comparable secrecy outage to TAS/MRC. Since GSC has a lower complexity than MRC and a higher complexity than SC, this figure confirms that TAS/GSC provides a cost-performance tradeoff in physical layer security enhancement. Fig. 2 compares the ε-outage secrecy rate of TAS with that of TBF versus N A for ε = 0.01. We consider the same TBF as in [9] where maximal ratio transmission is used at Alice and a single antenna is equipped at Bob. As such, we consider N B = 1 in Fig. 2 for the sake of a fair comparison. To facilitate this comparison, we derive a new expression for the secrecy outage probability of TBF with GSC at the eavesdropper by applying F γE (γ) in (6) with [9, eq. (38)], which results in
As expected, Fig. 2 shows that R max S increases with N A for both TAS and TBF. Notably, we observe that R max S of TAS is close to R max S of TBF when N A is small. We also observe that the rate advantage of TBF over TAS increases with N A . However, this advantage comes at the cost of higher feedback and signal processing overheads for TBF. Importantly, the feedback and signal processing overheads for TBF increase with N A , while those for TAS remain unchanged.
V. CONCLUSION We proposed TAS/GSC for physical layer security enhancement in MIMO wiretap channels. We derived new closed-form expressions for the exact and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, which demonstrate that the maximum secrecy outage diversity gain of N A N B is achieved. The tradeoff of TAS/GSC relative to TAS/SC and TAS/MRC is characterized by their respective secrecy outage SNR gains. 
